STATE LOTTERY ADOPTIONS AS POLICY INNOVATIONS: AN EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS FRANCES STOKES BERRY WILLIAM D. BERRY
Florida State University wo types of explanations of state government innovation have been proposed: internal determinants models (which posit that the factors causing a state government to innovate are political, economic, and social characteristics of a state) and regional diffusion models (which point toward the role of policy adoptions by neighboring states in prompting a state to adopt). We show that the two are conceptually compatible, relying on Mohr's theory of organizational innovation. Then we develop and test a unified explanation of state lottery adoptions reflecting both internal and regional influences. The empirical results provide a great degree of support for Mohr's theory. For the empirical analysis, we rely on event history analysis, a form of pooled cross-sectional time series analysis, which we believe may be useful in a wide variety of subfields of political science. Event history analysis may be able to explain important forms of political behavior (by individuals, organizations, or governments) even if they occur only rarely.
Innovation by state governments has been a major topic of research by political scientists for two decades. Walker (1969) began the effort with his seminal study of the innovativeness of states across 88 programs. Gray's (1973) influential study of state innovation in the areas of civil rights, welfare, and education and Grupp and Richards's (1975) important study of policy diffusion in a wide variety of policy areas soon followed. Numerous other studies of state innovation have been published in the 1970s and 1980s, yielding insights into the determinants of innovativeness in a variety of policy areas. These include studies of innovation in juvenile corrections (Downs 1976) , technology (Menzel and Feller 1977) , consumer affairs (Sigelman and Smith 1980) , energy (Regens 1980) , tort law (Canon and Baum 1981), judicial administration (Glick 1981) , and human services (Sigelman, Roeder, and Sigelman 1981) . But while expanding the scope of policy areas subject to innovation analysis, the research since 1975 has not led to major advances in our conceptualization of state innovation or our empirical approach to its investigation; the same basic approaches have simply been applied in new policy contexts.
A state government innovation has been defined as a "program or policy which is new to [the state] adopting it" (Walker 1969, 881) , and the central research question about state innovation is, What causes a government to adopt a new program or policy? We claim that two fundamental answers have been offered. Internal determinants models posit that the factors leading a state government to innovate are political, economic, and social characteristics internal to the state . Regional diffusion models emphasize the influence of nearby states, assuming that states emulate their neighbors when confronted with policy problems.1 A critical conceptual weakness in the state innovation literature is the segregation of these two types of explanations. Internal determinants models typically specify no role for regional influence (e.g., Downs 1976; Regens 1980), while regional diffusion models generally assume that internal state characteristics have no effect (e.g., Grupp and Richards 1975; Light 1978) . Even when both models have been investigated within a single study, their analyses have been kept distinct, with internal determinants models cast as analyses of the determinants or correlates of policy innovation and regional diffusion models framed as analyses of policy emulation or diffusion (e.g., Canon and Baum 1981; Gray 1973; Walker 1969 ). The separate treatment of the two models in the literature indicates a failure to recognize that regional diffusion is not a separate topic from innovation but, instead, one possible explanation for innovation.
Furthermore, neither a pure regional diffusion model nor a pure internal determinants model is a plausible explanation of state innovation in isolation. It is unrealistic to assume that a state blindly emulates its neighbors' policies without its public officials being influenced by the political and economic environment of their own state. It is also implausible to presume that states are totally insulated from influence by neighboring states, given the context of federalism, active national associations of state officials, and media attention on state innovations. Furthermore, the regional diffusion and internal determinants models can be unified theoretically without doing violence to either explanation. We show that both internal and regional influences on a state's likelihood of innovation can be predicted based on Mohr's (1969, 111) theory that the propensity to innovate is a function of "the motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles against innovation, and the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles."
We also offer a general empirical approach to studying innovation that allows for a test of a unified theory of state innovation reflecting both internal and regional effects and illustrate it with an analysis of state lottery adoptions. Our model of state lottery adoptions will be tested using pooled cross-sectional time series data, via event history analysis, a technique rarely used in political science but more common in other social and biological sciences. (Gray 1976 ) are applicable to both. But apart from this general limitation, the choice of a year for measuring the independent variables is problematic when adoptions by states, as is typical, are spread over several decades. Since a cause must precede its effect, the only logical alternative is to use data for characteristics of states from the time a policy was first adopted. However, this can mean that later adoptions are being "explained" with characteristics of states several decades ago. Nor do these strategies allow us to assess the effects of state characteristics that vary substantially from year to year. For example, the hypothesis that "popular" policies tend to be adopted primarily in election years could not be tested with either of these cross-sectional strategies.
Testing Regional Diffusion Explanations
Three approaches have been tried for testing regional diffusion models. Walker (1969) uses factor analysis to discover clusters of states having similar orders of adoption for a variety of policies and then assesses whether states in the same cluster are in the same region of the country (see also Canon and Baum 1981). Of course, this approach is possible only when one examines several policies. Moreover, the failure of clusters to conform to regional contours could be due to a set of policies diffusing from different "starting states," thereby resulting in different orders of adoption for different policies, even if each policy had indeed diffused regionally.
A second strategy has been to assess the relationship between adoptions by states and previous adoptions by their neighbors. Crain (1966) In event history analysis, the goal is to explain a qualitative change (an "event") that occurs in the behavior of an individual at a particular point in time. (In our description of EHA, we will call the unit of analysis an "individual" even though in some research applications, the actual unit may be an organization, a state, a nation, or some other collective.) The data for analysis, called an event history, is a longitudinal record showing whether and when the event was experienced by a sample of individuals during a period of observation. In a discrete time modelthe kind to be used in this study-the period of analysis is divided into a set of distinct units (e.g., years). But there are also continuous time EHA models that assume that the time of an event occurrence is measured exactly (Tuma and Hannan 1984) . A critical concept in EHA is the risk set, which is the set of individuals in the sample that are "at risk" of event occurrence (i.e., have a chance of experiencing the event) at a particular time. When the event under analysis is one that an individual cannot repeat (e.g., death), the size of the risk set will decrease over time as individuals in the sample experience the event.5 Indeed, when observations are annual, the size of the risk set is decreased at the end of each year by the number who experienced the event that year.
The variable to be explained in discrete time EHA is called the hazard rate and is defined as the probability Pit that an individual i will experience the event during a particular time period t, given that the individual is "at risk" at that time. The hazard rate is then presumed to be determined by a set of independent variables. Of course, the hazard rate, being a probability, is an unobserved variable. The observed dependent variable for estimating effects in EHA is a dummy variable that is scored one for each case when an individual experiences the event, zero otherwise. The dichotomous nature of this variable makes probit or logit the preferable estimation technique.
Since most individual government programs can only be adopted once by a given jurisdiction, in applying event history analysis to the study of state policy innovation analysts will typically be dealing with nonrepeatable events. Thus, the conceptual dependent variable or hazard rate would be the probability of a state's adopting a policy during a particular period, given that it has not already adopted it in a previous period. While in theory the time unit under consideration can be quite short, data constraints (which typically will preclude more-thanannual observations for many independent variables) make a calendar year a sensible choice. It is reasonable to assume that no state is "at risk" of adopting a given program until after at least one state has given it serious consideration. And given the practical difficulty of determining precisely when the first serious consideration occurred, in most applications it would be appropriate to assume that no state is at risk of adopting prior to the year of adoption by the first state. The data set for analysis would then be pooled cross-sectional time series, in which the cases are "state-years." More precisely, the data would consist of one observation per state for each year the state is at risk of adopting, that is, for each year in which the state had not adopted prior to the beginning of the year. The observed dependent variable would be a dummy variable indicating whether a state adopts the policy in a given year.
Event history analysis has several critical advantages over the standard methodologies for innovation research reviewed above. First, unlike the extant methods, it is suitable for testing a unified theory of state innovation incorporating both internal determinants and regional influences. For such a test, some independent vari-398 ables in the EHA equation would be internal characteristics of states, while others would reflect the adoption behavior of nearby states. Furthermore, including both regional and internal influences in the same model guards against mistaking a spurious relationship between states' years of adoptions and those of their neighbors (actually due to the operation of similar internal characteristics in neighboring states) as evidence of regional diffusion. Presumably, if the relationship were spurious, the estimated effects of terms representing the behavior of nearby states would diminish to near zero in the EHA equation, as these regional effects would be appropriately "controlled" for the impacts of internal characteristics.
Moreover, unlike the traditional crosssectional methods for testing internal determinants models, EHA can assess the effects on the probability of adoption of characteristics of states that vary substantially from year to year, as annual longitudinal variation is incorporated in the data set. Also, and again unlike crosssectional methods, the "pooled" nature of our data allows the dependent variable to be affected by independent variables with the right time property. It is not necessary to assume that a state adopting a program recently is affected by what its characteristics were when the first state adopted the program perhaps decades ago.
Finally, the use of EHA to study state innovation should dramatically increase the substantive relevance of research findings in the literature. The traditional approaches are capable of predicting only (1) whether a particular type of state should have adopted a policy prior to a specified date or not, or (2) the timing of a state's adoption relative to adoptions by other states. But EHA is equipped to yield more interesting conclusions. In particular, EHA can predict the probability that a particular type of state will adopt a policy during a particular year.
The extremely limited variance typically present in the adopt-versus-not-adoptin-a-given-year observed dependent variable may have deterred others who considered using a pooled cross-sectional time series approach for studying innovation. Since most programs can be adopted only once by each state and the years of adoption by different states can be spread over several decades, in a pooled data set consisting of cases "at risk" of adoption, the percentage of cases scored adopt can be less than 5%. While this may appear to be an almost insurmountable obstacle to fruitful empirical research the very low variance for the dependent variable in our lottery adoption analysis, as we will see, does not thwart our ability to conduct meaningful empirical research. Even though lottery adoptions are quite unusual events, we can study empirically the factors that lead states to adopt them.
A Unified Theory of State Innovation: Incorporating Internal and Regional Influences
Mohrs (1969) analysis of organizational innovation provides a foundation for building a theory that integrates the internal determinants and regional diffusion models of state innovation. Mohr (1969, 114) argues persuasively that the probability of innovation is inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation and directly related to (1) the motivation to innovate, and (2) the availability of resources for overcoming obstacles. He further hypothesizes that the motivation to innovate interacts with both the strength of obstacles and the amount of resources available in influencing the chances of adoption (p. 123). In particular, "when the obstacles are relatively great, and the resources small," even a high level of motivation should not produce innovation. But as obstacles diminish and resources rise, the impact of motivation on the probability of innovation 399 should increase. Conversely, when there is little motivation to innovate, the level of resources and the strength of obstacles are unlikely to have much effect on the probability of innovation, as without sufficient motivation the probability of innovation should be uniformly low. But as motivation to innovate increases, the influence of both resource availability and the strength of obstacles should grow.
It is clear that numerous internal determinants of innovation in a state can be conceived as reflecting the motivation of politicians to innovate, the obstacles they face, or the resources available to overcome these obstacles. The issue is whether regional influences are consistent with Mohr's theory, as we maintain. Elazar (1972) claims that state policy makers tend to view nearby states as "experimental laboratories" for policies. The consequences of adopting a new program can be very difficult to predict; information about effects of the program in a similar state can help overcome the uncertainty. Thus, policy adoptions by nearby states provide a critical resource (information) for overcoming an obstacle (uncertainty) to innovation. Furthermore, with a policy unpopular with the electorate, it should be easier for politicians to justify its adoption to voters if it has first been adopted by nearby states. Thus, again, the presence of previously adopting nearby states becomes a resource useful for overcoming an obstacle to innovation (in this case, negative public opinion). With a policy that is generally popular with voters, the existence of previously adopting nearby states should intensify internal political pressures to adopt, as voters see a popular policy in place in nearby states and want it in their state as well. Consequently, as a greater number of nearby states adopt a popular policy, the motivation of a state's politicians to adopt is heightened. Hence, regional influences on state innovation are fully predictable based on Mohr's theory.
This insight suggests that a unified theory of the causes of state innovation, relying on both internal and regional influences, can be developed. Indeed, the recognition that previously adopting nearby states can be a resource for overcoming obstacles to innovation-combined with Mohr's hypothesis that "level of resources" interacts with "motivation to innovate" in influencing the probability of innovation-suggests that the strength of regional influences on a state's probability of innovation should vary depending on the internal environment in a state. If so, both pure internal determinants and regional diffusion models would not only be incomplete explanations of state innovation, but the failure to incorporate either of these sources of influence (internal or regional) in a theory of state innovation may actually prevent the discovery of empirical support for the other. In the next section, we use Mohr's theory to develop an explanation for the adoption of state lotteries (1) reflecting both internal and regional influences on the probability of innovation and (2) specifying how the two should interact.
An Explanation of State Lottery Adoptions
Our model assumes that the probability that a state without a lottery will adopt one in a given year is determined by both the state's internal characteristics and the previous pattern of lottery adoptions by nearby states. Moreover, we expect the natures of the political and economic environments to interact in influencing the probability of a lottery adoption. When a state's treasury is fiscally healthy, public officials are unlikely to adopt a lottery even if it is an election year. But if a state is in poor fiscal health, whether a lottery is adopted or not should be more strongly influenced by the proximity of elections. During an election year, a lottery may seem like the ideal solution to politicians, but in a year following an election, politicians may prefer to rely on relatively unpopular actions (like cutting spending or increasing mandatory taxes), thereby reserving the lottery option for a situation in which a 401 fiscal crisis occurs during an election year. According to this view, both poor fiscal health and being in an election year are necessary conditions for adopting a lottery.
HYPOTHESIS 3. The poorer the fiscal health of a state's government, the stronger the effect of elections on the probability that the state will adopt a lottery. Similarly, the fiscal health of a state should have a stronger impact on the probability of adoption in an election year than in a year after an election.6
Hypotheses Concerning the Obstades to Innovation
Two potential obstacles to adopting a lottery are (1) organized constituencies opposed to a lottery and (2) a state population with insufficient financial resources to support a lottery adequately. In particular, a low level of personal income in a state can be viewed as an obstacle to a successful lottery. While state lotteries are generally regressive in their incidence (Suits 1977 ), lottery participation rates are still highest among middle-and upperincome levels (Mikesell and Zorn 1986, 315) . Therefore, the lower the average income in a state, the greater should be the concern by public officials that a lottery will be unsuccessful in raising revenues. HYPOTHESIS 4. The lower the level of personal income in a state, the lower the probability that the state will adopt a lottery.7
State officials concerned about reelection must also be sensitive to any strongly held beliefs against the lottery among the HYPOTHESIS 5. The greater the proportion of a state's population adhering to fundamentalist religions, the lower the probability that the state will adopt a lottery.
But as we have seen, Mohr (1969) asserts that the strength of obstacles to innovation interacts with the motivation to innovate in influencing the probability of adoption: the greater the level of motivation, the greater the effect of "strength of obstacles" on "likelihood of innovation." In our analysis fiscal health and election proximity are presumed to be the principal determinants of the motivation to innovate, and fundamentalist opposition and low personal income are the obstacles.
HYPOTHESIS 6. The effect of religious fundamentalism as an obstacle to lottery adoption is greater in an election year and when a state's fiscal health is poor than in a year after an election and when fiscal health is stronger.
HYPOTHESIS 7. The effect of low personal income as an obstacle to lottery adoption is greater in an election year and when a state's fiscal health is poor than in a year after an election and when fiscal health is stronger.
Hypotheses Concerning Resources for Overcoming Obstades
Two kinds of political resources are expected to help state officials overcome obstacles to adopting a lottery: unified party control of government and previous adoptions by nearby states. Susan Hansen (1983, 153-54) hypothesizes that states in which the governorship and both houses of the legislature are controlled by the same political party are more likely to adopt a tax than states in which governmental institutions are under divided party control, regardless of which party is in power. This is because a unified government can better avoid the "roadblocks" resulting from the need for compromise between two parties. The need for a unified government may be greater when considering the adoption of a controversial mandatory tax than when contemplating adopting a more popular lottery. But Hansen's logic seems applicable to the case of lottery adoptions as well, as unified governments should be more capable than divided governments of achieving the necessary consensus on the specific nature of a lottery (e.g., whether the revenues generated are to go into a state's "general fund" or be earmarked for a particular public service).8 HYPOTHESIS 8. When a single political party controls the governorship and both houses of the legislature, the probability that the state will adopt a lottery is greater than when the government is under divided party control.
We argue above that previous adoptions by nearby states can also provide an important resource for overcoming obstacles to innovation, as such adoptions yield important information about a policy's effects. The logic supporting this proposition is applicable in the case of the lottery, thereby suggesting that the probability of a lottery adoption increases as a greater number of nearby states adopt it. But specifying this hypothesis requires us to be more precise about the meaning of a "nearby" state. The literature suggests several possibilities.
First, the states could be divided into predesignated regions with the hypothesis that a state's probability of adopting a lottery increases as the number of states in its region that have previously adopted it gets larger. But this approach has significant weaknesses. The variety of different regional demarcations in the literature, with different numbers of regional clusters and different groupings of states within these clusters (see esp. Sharkansky 1970) illustrates the difficulty of justifying any particular demarcation. While one might introduce a theoretical argument in support of one demarcation or another (e.g., Elazar 1972), the choice of how to define regional clusters remains largely arbitrary. Furthermore, whenever predesignated regions with fixed boundaries are defined, some states that border each other necessarily wind up in different regions. So in testing a regional influence hypothesis, the impact of some neighboring states would inevitably be ignored.
A second conception of regional influence would involve both predesignated regions and predesignated leader states within those regions. We would hypothesize that a state's probability of adopting a lottery increases after one or more states with a reputation as a leader within its region adopt it. This definition is consistent with research that has found that there are states to which the other states in a region look most frequently for innovative ideas (Grupp and Richards 1975; Menzel and Feller 1977) . This conception of regional diffusion is most attractive when there are reliable data about which states are perceived by public officials to be regional leaders in a policy area. Unfortunately, we have no such data for lotteries.
The conception of regional influence used in this study defines "nearby" states 403 as immediate neighbors (i.e., states that share a boundary). The advantage of this definition is that we are not required to assign states to predesignated regions arbitrarily. Instead, all of a state's neighbors that have previously adopted a lottery are assumed to be influential in promoting innovation. Indeed, a conception of regional influence that focuses on immediate neighbors seems especially appropriate in the case of the lottery. When a state adopts a lottery and a neighboring state does not have one, people living near the border in the neighboring state can cross the border to purchase tickets. This places pressure on state officials to adopt a lottery to try to keep a state's own "tax base" from being taxed by a neighbor. HYPOTHESIS 9. The probability that a state will adopt a lottery is positively related to the number of states that border it that have already adopted.
Mohr (1969) also argues that the availability of resources for overcoming obstacles to innovation interacts with the motivation to innovate in determining the probability of adoption. When the level of motivation to innovate is high, the effect of "resource availability" on 'likelihood of innovation" is stronger than when motivation to innovate is low. HYPOTHESIS 10. The effect of unified political party control in overcoming obstacles to lottery adoption is greater in an election year and when a state's fiscal health is poor than in a year after an election and when fiscal health is stronger.
HyPoTEsis 11. The effect of previously adopting neighboring states in overcoming obstacles to lottery adoption is greater in an election year and when a state's fiscal health is poor than in a year after an election and when fiscal health is stronger.
An Event History Analysis Model of Lottery Adoption
These 11 hypotheses combine to suggest the following EHA model: ADOPTij = 0 (bFISCALittj + b2PARTYZtt + b3ELECT1lt, + b4ELECT2,t + bsINCOMEit-1 + b6RELIGIONit,1 + b7NEIGHBORSit,)
where the conceptual dependent variable or hazard rate ADOPIjt is the probability that state i will adopt a lottery in year t, given that the state has not adopted a lottery prior to year t, and 0 denotes the cumulative normal distribution function.
Thus, equation 1 takes the form of a probit model.9 ADOPTi, is measured with a dummy variable equaling one if state i adopts a lottery in year t, zero otherwise.
In the equation, FISCALjt_-denotes the fiscal health of a state's government in the previous year. To control for size differences across states, fiscal health is measured by the ratio of total-state-revenueminus-total-state-spending to total spending. Several independent variables-including FISCAL-are measured in the previous year, since legislative sessions typically begin in January so that legislators must often make policy based on the prior year's fiscal and economic data. Moreover, if revenue and expenditure data from the same year that a lottery adoption occurred were used to measure FISCAL, the adoption might generate revenues that would go into the calculation of FISCAL. To make certain that FIS-CAL may cause ADOPT, but ADOPT may not affect FISCAL, FISCAL must be "lagged" behind ADOPT. (For more specific descriptions of the indicators for the independent variables in equation 1, see the Appendix.) INCOMEj,tL represents personal income, as measured by real per capita in-404 come, in state i in the previous year. RELIGION is the proportion of a state's population adhering to fundamentalist religions. PARTY is the degree to which a single political party controls the institutions of state government; it is operationalized with a dichotomous variable distinguishing situations in which the governor and the two legislative houses are controlled by the same party from situations in which there is split control (see Hansen 1983) . NEIGHBORS i, the term reflecting regional influence, denotes the number of previously adopting neighboring states, that is, the number of states sharing a border with state i that had adopted a lottery prior to year t. Equation 1 was also estimated using an alternative measure of NEIGHBORS, the percentage of states sharing a border that had previously adopted a lottery. The resulting coefficient estimates are quite similar to those based on number of previous adopters.
Finally, two dummy variables are included to specify the election cycle hypothesis: ELECTI, which equals one in the year of a gubernatorial election, zero otherwise; and ELECT2, which equals one if it is neither the year of an election nor the year after an election, zero otherwise. Our hypotheses predict that the coefficients for FISCAL and RELIGION will be negative, and that those for PARTY, INCOME, NEIGHBORS, ELECT1 and ELECT2 will be positive. Furthermore, we predict that the coefficient for ELECTI should be greater than that for ELECT2. This would mean that in states with fouryear gubernatorial terms-the modal length among states-the probability of a lottery adoption is highest in an election year, lowest in a year immediately following an election, and in between these two values in other years.
Empirical Analysis of the Model of State Lottery Adoption
The first task in testing an EHA model is defining the risk set. Because our model specifies effects by neighboring states, the sample is confined to the forty-eight continental U. Table 1 , column 1. Overall, the support for the model is exceedingly strong. Despite the fact that lottery adoptions are quite rare, with only 3% of the observations in our sample scored as adoptions, nearly all hypotheses receive support. These include Hypotheses 1 and 2 about "motivation" factors. The negative coefficient for FISCAL confirms that as expected, a decline in a state's fiscal health increases the probability of its adopting a lottery. But the political climate also matters. The fact that the coefficients for ELECTI and ELECT2 are both positive, while the former is larger, implies that lottery adoptions are most likely in election years and least likely in years immediately after elections. In states with a gubernatorial election every four years the probability of a lottery adoption is highest in an election year, decreases in the following year, and then increases again for the next two years as an election gets closer but not to as high a level as during an election year. This finding suggests that politicians do seek to adopt popular policies during election years, when the accompanying electoral rewards should be at their maximum.
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Hypotheses 4 and 5 concerning obstacles to innovation are also confirmed. The positive coefficient estimate for INCOME (significant at the .001 level) is consistent with the proposition that politicians perceive low state personal income as an obstacle to a successful lottery. As predicted, the lower the level of per capita income, the lower the probability of a lottery adoption. Moreover, state officials seem to be influenced by opposition to the lottery on religious grounds. The likelihood of a lottery adoption decreases as the share of a state's population adhering to fundamentalist religions (RELIGION) increases.
There is mixed empirical evidence about the hypotheses concerning availability of resources. The regional influence proposition (Hypothesis 9) receives strong support. The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for NEIGHBORS suggests that the probability that a state will adopt a lottery increases as the number of its neighbors that have previously adopted it grows, even when the effects of "internal" characteristics have been controlled.
But Hypothesis 8-which predicts that governments controlled by a single political party are more likely to adopt a lottery than those under split control-fails 406 to receive support. Indeed, the opposite relationship seems to hold. Governments under split control are more likely to adopt than those that are unified. As we have noted, Hansen (1983) postulates that unified governments are more likely to adopt sales and income taxes than divided governments. We extended that logic to the case of the lottery. But it may be that unified governments, when motivated to increase state revenues, seek to capitalize on their monopoly control over the institutions of government to achieve a substantial tax increase by either adopting a new sales or income tax or raising existing tax rates. If, in contrast, divided governments lack the political resources to increase unpopular mandatory taxes and must instead settle for a less controversial lottery adoption, this might account for our finding that divided governments are more likely to adopt a lottery than unified governments.
A great advantage of event history analysis for state innovation research is that the coefficient estimates it generates can be used to calculate predicted probabilities that a state with specified characteristics will adopt a policy in any given year. These predicted probabilities can offer analysts powerful substantive conclusions-not available from traditional cross-sectional approaches to innovation research-about the magnitudes of effects of the factors determining adoption likelihood. Moreover, an analysis of such predicted probabilities allows researchers to assess the nature of interactions among the determinants of adoption probability." Table 2 presents predicted probabilities of a lottery adoption (derived from probit MLEs) for hypothetical states with differing characteristics. To enhance the interpretability of the predicted probabilities, we deleted the unified government variable (PARTY) from the EHA model and calculated the probabilities associated with this revised model. (The MLEs for the equation excluding PARTY are in Table 1 , column 2.) We deleted party because (1) its MLE is fairly strong but in a direction contrary to that hypothesized and (2) since it is dichotomous, it would have to be fixed at one of its two extremes (rather than a "central" value) when calculating predicted probabilities, thereby magnifying its effect.
Each grouping (of three or seven lines) in Table 2 shows the change in the predicted probability of a lottery adoption that results when one independent variable is changed from one extreme to another while the remaining independent variables are held constant at specified values. (For ease of viewing, the values of variables that are "changing" are denoted in the table in italics, while values of variables being held constant are in roman type.) These predicted probabilities permit us to assess the hypotheses predicting interaction among the factors influencing the probability of a lottery adoption.12 Hypothesis 3 receives support from the first section of Table 2 . The predicted probabilities show that the effect of elections on the probability of a lottery adoption does depend on the fiscal health of the state. The top half of the first section shows that the impact of elections is very small when fiscal health is exceptionally good and the other determinants of adoption probability are at "central" or "moderate" values. In particular, in a hypothetical state with (1) no lottery, (2) very good fiscal health, (3) a gubernatorial election every four years, (4) per capita income and percentage fundamentalist population at their average values across cases in the sample, and (5) two neighboring states that have previously adopted a lottery, the expected probability of a lottery adoption decreases only slightly from .028 in an election year to .003 the year after (for a probability difference of .025).13 But as fiscal health deteriorates, the effect of elections intensifies. As seen in the bottom half of the first section, a hypothetical state that is in very poor fiscal health but 407 has "central" values on other variables, has a .053 (= .063 -.010) greater chance of adopting a lottery during an election year than in the year immediately after. The interaction between fiscal health and election proximity is also evidenced in the second section of Table 2 , which shows clearly that the effect of fiscal health is dependent on the proximity of elections. In the year after an electionand at "central values" for other independent variables-fiscal health is virtually unrelated to the probability of a tax adoption (see the top half of the second section). But in an election year, fiscal health has an effect, albeit small, on the chance of an adoption. The predicted likelihood of a lottery adoption increases by .036 (from .027 to .063) when a state government's fiscal health deteriorates from very good to very poor.
Moreover, as we hypothesized, the 409 fiscal health of a state's government and the proximity of elections appear to be important contextual motivation factors that determine how obstacles to innovation and resource availability impinge on the probability that a state will adopt a lottery. With respect to the interaction between motivation to innovate and obstacles to innovation, Hypotheses 6 and 7 both receive striking support. The effects of religious fundamentalism and low personal income as obstacles to lottery adoption increase as ( For example, even a state in poor fiscal health during an election year is predicted to have virtually no chance (.004) of adopting a lottery if personal income is extremely low; but when income is very high, the probability increases to .317. Finally, there is evidence that regional influence on the probability of a lottery adoption varies depending on the level of motivation to innovate, as predicted by Hypothesis 11.15 When it is a year following an election and a state is in moderate fiscal health, the number of its neighbors having lotteries has only a slight effect on its probability of adoption; a state in the year after an election and moderate fiscal health with as many as four neighbors having lotteries has only a .021 (= .022 -.001) greater predicted probability of adoption than a state with no such neighbors (see the top third of the fifth section). But if fiscal health remains moderate and it is an election year, the effect of previously adopting neighbors on the likelihood of adoption is stronger (see the middle third of the fifth section). Finally, the bottom third of the fifth section shows that the effect of neighboring states is still stronger when a state is both in an election year and in poor fiscal health.
Conclusion
Our empirical analysis offers a great deal of support for our unified model of state lottery adoptions. There is evidence for both the internal determinants and regional diffusion models of state innovation, as both (1) internal political and economic characteristics of a state and (2) the number of previously adopting neighboring states are found to influence the probability of a lottery adoption. Also, these two dominant explanations of state innovation are in no sense inconsistent. We have seen that expectations of both internal and regional influences can be derived from Mohr's theory of innovation. And our study of lottery adoptions confirms all essential elements of Mohr's theory. The probability of state innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation, and directly related to the availability of resources for overcoming these obstacles. Moreover, Mohr's assertion that these three critical determinants interact in their influence on the probability of innovation receives 410 consistent support. One such interaction in the context of lottery adoptions is between the influences of (1) neighboring states, and (2) "internal" factors reflecting the motivation to innovate (i.e., fiscal health and election proximity). Neighboring states are found to have a stronger impact on the likelihood of a lottery adoption when the internal characteristics of a state are themselves favorable for innovation (e.g., poor fiscal health and an election year). This reinforces our claim that regional diffusion and internal determinants explanations of state innovation should not be analyzed in isolation; instead, unified models are needed.
Our study also has other implications for future political science research. First, our findings suggest that scholars of state innovation should not be deterred by the fact that they are almost always attempting to explain rare events. State lottery adoptions are very unusual events; only 3% of the cases in our sample are scored adoption; fully 97% of the cases are stateyears in which no lottery was adopted. But despite this fact, we can explain quite well when and why lottery adoptions occur. While we cannot be certain that similar studies of innovation in other policy areas would be as successful, we believe our findings are sufficiently promising to encourage students of state innovation to undertake event history analyses of other types of policy adoptions.
With event history analysis, scholars can subject theories of state government innovation to a powerful test by assessing whether these theories can predict the probability that a particular type of state will adopt a particular policy in a particular year. We believe that such analyses can yield conclusions about the factors encouraging innovation with considerably greater substantive relevance than studies using methodologies dominant in the literature to date. Moreover, event history analysis has proven successful for testing (and supporting) a theory of innovation assuming that both a state's internal characteristics and nearby states influence the probability of a policy adoption. The methodologies used in previous innovation research have precluded empirical evidence for this expectation.
Finally, we hope that our success in using event history analysis to explain state adoptions of lotteries will encourage scholars in other subfields of political science to consider EHA's potential as an empirical tool. With it one might study a wide range of political events and in doing so take advantage of both temporal and cross-sectional variation in political behavior. Moreover, even when the event analyzed occurs only rarely, event history analysis has proven capable (in this study at least) of generating meaningful empirical results. This suggests that political scientists might be able to use EHA to undertake rigorous empirical testing of explanations of events generally considered too rare to be studied using multivariate analysis. 11. The reliance on a probit specification for our model makes it so that our hypotheses predicting interaction are not fully distinct from hypotheses about coefficients for individual independent variables in equation 1. As long as the coefficients for the independent variables are nonzero, some interaction among the independent variables in influencing the probability of adoption is guaranteed.
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12. In the probit model of equation 1, the independent variables are assumed to be linearly and additively related to an unmeasured continuous interval-level variable that might be conceived as the inclination to adopt a lottery. Thus, the interactions we find among independent variables are interactions in influencing the probability of adoption (constrained to be within the range from zero to one) rather than the inclination to adopt, which is unconstrained with respect to maximum and minimum.
13. For a justification of the precise values at which the independent variables are set (e.g., the value for FISCAL that represents "very good" fiscal health), see the notes to Table 2. 14. A state in the year after an election with moderate fiscal health and a very small fundamentalist population has only a .025 (-.026 -.001) greater probability of adoption than a state with a very large fundamentalist population.
15. We do not even attempt to assess Hypothesis 10, since Hypothesis 8-also about the effect of unified control of government-is disconfirmed.
